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Standing here, I feel like a Baltic herring. It's a grateful, surprised feeling. Many people thought that overfishing and pollution would lead to the extermination of herring. However, the opposite has happened. The predators – cod, salmon and so on – have declined so much faster that herring suddenly find themselves relatively unopposed. When this Symposium began, I was depressed by the confidence of strong, predatory attitudes which threatened to drive the search for solutions into species collapse. The cod-like rejectionist attitude claimed that global capitalism was unredeemable, while the salmon-like market fundamentalists shrugged off all critiques of their development model as ignorant and irrelevant. The silver herring, those who know that this version of global growth is unjust but who want to study and organize resistance to overcome it, seemed endangered. But now, at the last plenary of this Symposium, I see how much our environment has changed. These intense discussions have gradually driven both rejectionism and fundamentalism into retreat, and all around me I see the happy glitter of new organic projects, new alliances between educators, politicians and ecologists, new media reports snapping up concrete stories of environmental abuse. Herring, the “silver darlings”, as the Scottish song called them – get things done.

Inequality? I remember my mother's 90th birthday party, a good many years ago, when I went to the newspaper archives to see what they were talking about the day she was born. One theme was dog-pollution; the new automobile was forcing dogs to forsake the street for the pavements, with horrid consequences for ladies' long dresses. But a bigger theme was what was then called “The Problem of Poverty”. How was it possible, these nice British newspaper readers asked, that while Edwardian Britain was growing so obviously richer – in mechanical equipment, in domestic luxury and convenience – the urban and rural poor were growing so obviously poorer? Something like a global market existed, financed largely by British capital and carried largely in British ships. Surely free trade must lead to general prosperity. Was this deepening misery caused by some simple mistake in applying free-trading principles? Or could there be a direct connection, so that the increase of national and middle-class wealth actually required a corresponding increase in poverty?

Few of these nice British newspaper readers had read Karl Marx, or considered concepts like the “reserve army of labour” or class struggle interpreted as an inevitable dialectic. Instead, they thought of the so-called “problem of poverty” in moral terms. They looked at their own lives – the servants downstairs, the glossy horses in the stable, the vast Edwardian meals beginning with ptarmigan mousse from some bird-slaughter in Scotland and ending with Cuban cigars - and they felt intense distress and guilt at the idea that their own selfish indulgence might be the cause of dying babies and child prostitutes in the streets of their own city. Socialists, they knew, said that growing inequality had nothing to do with individual behaviour. But they wanted to be responsible, to take the

blame. Wasteful consumption! Perhaps it would help the poor if one lit fewer coal fires, brushed one's own hair and sent one's daughters to dancing-class by bus. They read articles praising the poor for trying to maintain Christian values as they "slaved away in their back alleys". But had they ever been down an alley, or met a poor person with a name as opposed to a class ?

I think we should be very vigilant about the sort of concern for the oppressed which rests on forms of collective self-reproach. A wonderful sci-fi fable appeared in the 1950s called "The Midas Plague" (I forget the author), imagining a future in which society rewarded its leaders by austerity instead of wealth. The more deserving you were, the less you had to consume, so that a prime minister or CEO was allowed to live in an almost empty apartment, without TV or car and to wear the plainest clothes. Nearer the foot of the pyramid, people toiled to purchase compulsory quotas of possessions, dreaming of a day when smiling bailiffs would cart off their washing machine and replace their sofa with a wooden chair.

The point of this fable, to me, is how Western it is. I am not saying that other cultures do not respect self-denial or holy poverty. What is peculiarly Western about this tale is the urge to associate personal consumption with sin and to impute moral value to poverty and the lack of possessions. Most of us here share that urge. When an African family is suddenly evicted, by war for instance, a woman can usually wrap all the household's possessions into a single length of cloth. Her child might carry the most precious item, the 20-litre plastic water container (which, as Ryszard Kapuscinski has written, is the most important improvement to African rural life in a quarter-century). Yes, it is right to be moved by that austerity, that lightness of tread. But it's important to be sure that the compassion is for the real poor of the earth, the actually-existing and increasing men, women and children in want, and not for an imagined poor we invent for the drama of our own consciences.

After all, we in the post-imperial world (and I speak as one who knew the late British Empire) conscripted the populations of other continents first as labourers, then as soldiers, then as consumers of industrial and pharmaceutical goods (bicycles, aspirin, then Mercedes). Do we have to carry through a fourth conscription, in which the village people of Africa or India are recruited as crowd extras, registering silent misery in a corner of the stage as we leap around in our own psychodrama of mutual accusation and guilt?

Only very few people here, on the basis of what I have seen this week, could be charged with inventing their own poor. This ship is packed with hard experience, organizational and physical (how interesting it is to that so many people on board who are now in holy orders have also worked hard with their hands). But there are a few wisps of fantasy around, and I want briefly to mention one of them. Some radical speakers have talked about growth as an exclusively Western ideology of power, as an ethnocentric Western concept. Well, yes and no. Growth as an ideology for universal export – 19th century free trade, 20th century state socialism or 21st century neo-liberalism – has certainly emanated from the West. But the implication that indigenous, traditional societies have never

committed the original sin of growth and capital accumulation is simply eccentric. Isn't there a tendency here to perpetuate 19th century thinking about so-called "primitives", the model which saw Mali villagers or native American hunters as static prehistoric cultures which had somehow lacked the growth gene? It is that view, of a supposedly changeless and thus ideal form of society, which is such a Western ethnocentric concept, and so wrong. Archaeology has shown how vigorous and changeable was the history of these peoples who were until yesterday assumed to have no history. How often they evinced phases of growth, steep or gradual, or indeed of what Professor LaTouche has nicely called 'décroissance"! Perhaps the question here is why we still need to believe in virtuous collectivist poverty as the human norm. The reality is that traditional societies sometimes observe social and economic equality, and sometimes don't. The same culture can veer from elitist tyranny based on surpluses from crops or trade to humble agrarian communism within a few generations. I repeat: let's not invent a shiny mythical poverty to hide the disconcerting faces of the real thing.

So at last I come to the question I am supposed to address: does the Western model of development inherently lead to inequality? At one level the answer is easy: a four-letter word: Sure! Of course it leads to inequality. More to the point, it increases inequality – within a society and between nations, regions or continents. After a Symposium as informative as this, we scarcely need to hear more evidence: what the Bishop of London, speaking at Tallinn, called "the dismal litany". Still, I must pay my respects to it. Glance at the base-line: deaths in pregnancy in G8 countries are 1 in 4085, and in Africa 1 in 13. Deaths of children under 5, per thousand, are 6 in the G8 countries, and 174 in Africa. As for the trend, without reeling through country-by-country examples, let's remain with the figure cited for us last year by Sadruddin Aga Khan (how heartbreaking to see him again the other night repeating it on the video): despite all the poverty-reduction campaigns in the last dozen years, the actual number of people living in poverty has increased by about 100 millions.

But the answers to the next two questions are less easy. First, does this model of development lead to inequality because it actually *requires* a condition of growing inequality in order to operate? And secondly, is this really the only available model of development – indeed, is it the only Western one?

To start with the first question: I have noticed copies of Joseph Stiglitz's book "Globalisation and its Discontents" lying around the ship, and the Bishop of London, who has had this contemporary guru in his cathedral, quoted from it. Stiglitz does not in fact believe that a free-market economy can only succeed if it impoverishes a section of its potential consumers. But he knows somebody who does. "One Nobel Prize winner, Arthur Lewis, argued that inequality was good for development and economic growth, since the rich save more than the poor, and the key to growth was capital accumulation". In other words, the trickle-down theory. You have to have an overflowing rich layer stationed very high above the rest of the society for the trickle to fall with sufficient impact. But I was happy to hear from Stephen Lintner that the World Bank, which has done some re-thinking recently, has now abandoned the trickle-down case for inequality. It was never much of a theory. People who get a trickle soon demand a water main.

Remember the New Yorker in Yankee Stadium who was surprised by a jacket falling on him from the gallery above? He stood up and yelled: "Where's da pants?"

If there were no inequality, there would be no trade. But the present world trade system has failed to prevent inequality from ballooning into a massive extension of the sort of poverty which excludes hundreds of millions of people from the market place – including many millions who were in the market place before. In other words, its product is not so much the spread of purchasing power as the spread of economic and social powerlessness.

There are several explanations for this. The simplest is sheer incompetence. The international economic institutions did not mean, for instance, to end up with a Russia in which economic reform led to a steep fall in life expectancy and an increase in poverty from 2 per cent in 1989 to 23.8 per cent in 1998. But in spite of warnings, they did not see that forcing through the sale of public-sector industry without ensuring open competition would hand Russia over to anarcho-capitalism run by the Mafia. .

A second theory (see for example the film by John Pilger about foreign investment in Indonesia which we watched on Thursday evening) suggests that the spreading of gross inequality and powerlessness is deliberate. It is designed to prepare the way for a police state in which labour is kept cheap for foreign investors by the police baton and the army torture chamber, and where natural resources – including tourism - can be looted by a small kleptocracy without regard for damage to the environment or to human needs.

This clearly can happen. But as a theory of intentional conspiracy, it is too crude. It overlooks one fundamental feature of this sort of capitalism, reproduced in its institutions such as the World Bank or the WTO: a staggering short-termism. This is not just a matter of clear-felling forests and moving on, or of asset-stripping a water industry which was once a public utility. It is pathological indifference to political consequences. We cannot really expect bright young economists to predict the movements of the stock market with any accuracy. We might, though, expect them to predict that people who have been driven out of their land and homes by riot police acting for a foreign open-cast mining firm will eventually join an insurrection, and that bribable neo-liberal tyrannies will eventually be overthrown by regimes with a very different view of foreign-based multinationals.

In short, by promoting inequality this development model is sawing off the branch on which it sits. But haven't we known for a hundred years two things about capitalism: first that it is the most transforming force known to history and second that, if it is not guided and restrained, it will self-destruct, having devastated the resources and the context which made it possible? Look at the fishermen's tragedy, familiar in most enclosed seas like this one. Stage 1: an overexploited commercial fish stock begins to collapse. Stage 2: the worried fishermen borrow money for more effective nets and location gear. Result: fish numbers fall even lower. Stage 3: with incomes from catches vanishing, some fishers double-mortgage their homes to buy boats so large and high-tech they can scoop up the last shoals. Result: the fish disappear, the marine ecology is trashed and fishing

communities collapse under astronomical debt. It's a Baltic coastal village, but it's also a microcosm of what unregulated capitalism does to itself and to the world.

This leads to the second question. Is this the only development model in town? No, of course not. But while the town is under American occupation, it is the only model we will be offered. Can we agree to separate two things which are too often confused into one? Globalisation is a sort of landscape. The neo-liberal free-market economy is the current system of cultivation in that landscape. Globalisation, in the sense of the technologies which are spreading across the world and the end of the purely local dimension, is not reversible. (The absolute control of the old nation-state will never return. Contrast the situation in Gdynia in December 1981, where the Polish military coup silenced all postal, telephonic, telex and broadcast communication with the outside world with Iraq in April-May 2003, where the "Baghdad Blogger" kept emailing the world in defiance of Saddam's secret police). But the dominant ideology, or so-called "Western development model", certainly is reversible. A better model would limit some of the damage done within the globalised context, regulating currency speculation for example, and reserving the power to intervene in the free movement of capital. Professor Nikos Mouzelis spoke in one of our issue-group sessions about a "humane, social-democratic" form of market economy. I agree with him that we must find means of restoring public authority – in a state or in a global supranational institution – to regulate the global economy. And we must also restore politics. As Archbishop Diarmid Martin says, development must be about empowering people by helping them to escape from poverty, and that can only happen if the people rally to help themselves.

I wonder why we call this the "Western" development model. Market fundamentalism is not in the European tradition, in which government regulates free capitalism and mitigates its destructive consequences. This is an American model. In particular, it is the ideology of right-wing Republicanism, of the so-called Washington Consensus and now of the New American Century group which promotes unilateral American interests in the world with the sanction of armed force. We should not be embarrassed to say this in a public forum. If we do not, then we conceal the crucial fact: that much less callous variants of open economies exist and can be operated in a globalised world economy. As John Gray writes in his book "False Dawn", the global free market system presupposes Western domination. "It does not square with a pluralist world in which there is no power that can hope to exercise the hegemony that Britain, the United States and other western states possessed in the past... It does not allow the world's manifold cultures to achieve modernizations that are adapted to their histories, circumstances and distinctive needs" (20). Globalisation, in other words, will actually work to frustrate market fundamentalism, not to advance it.

All that we have heard in this Symposium confirms to me that this world economic order has grown too unjust and too destructive to last. Its doom, if not in sight, is round the corner. Perhaps its gurus know it. Listening to Sadruddin again the other night, and his complaint that the term "sustainable development" had been hijacked, it struck me that there may be a deeper reason why corporate public relations people talk so compulsively

about “sustainability”. It’s because, somewhere inside, they know that the thing which really isn’t sustainable is themselves.